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Abstract
In this Note, the dispute settlement case involving the marketing of United States-made metal
baseball bats in Japan will be examined. The effectiveness of the Standards Code’s dispute settle-
ment procedures will be analyzed through an examination of the metal bat case and its effect on
Japan’s standards laws and certification systems.
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PURSUANT TO THE AGREEMENT
ON TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE: THE UNITED
STATES-JAPAN METAL BAT DISPUTE
INTRODUCTION
The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (Standards
Code or Code)' was adopted pursuant to the Tokyo Round negotia-
1. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 405, T.I.A.S.
No. 9616 [hereinafter cited as Standards Code].
In the 1960's, the formation of an electrical certification system in Europe, which was
closed to non-European electrical products, created pressure for the development of an
agreement that would regulate the use of standards and certification systems in international
trade. 4 U.S. DEP'T OF COM., TECHNICAL BAwuERs To TRADE I (The Tokyo Round Trade
Agreements, Sept. 1981). According to the Standards Code, a standard is a "technical
specification approved by a recognized standardizing body for repeated or continuous appli-
cation with which compliance is not mandatory." Standards Code, supra, annex 1 (a techni-
cal specification is a "specification contained in a document which lays down characteristics
of a product such as levels of quality, performance, safety or dimensions."). However, under
the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. § 2571 (Supp. V 1981), Congress did not
distinguish between mandatory and nonmandatory specifications when defining the term
standard. Id. For purposes of this Note, the term standard will refer to both mandatory and
nonmandatory technical specifications, unless otherwise stated. Certification systems, which
are used to determine whether a product conforms to applicable standards, "include docu-
ments, marks or other evidence of conformity with standards." Note, Technical Analysis of
the Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, 12 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 179, 182 n.27 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Technical Analysis]. According to the Trade Agreements Act of
1979, the term certification system means a system "(A) for determining whether a product
conforms with product standards applicable to that product; and (B) if a product so con-
forms, for attesting, by means of a document, mark, or other appropriate evidence of
conformity, to that conformity." 19 U.S.C. § 2571 (Supp. V 1981).
An international working group of GATT began to draft such a standards and certifica-
tion system agreement in 1967. U.S. DEP'T OF COM., supra, at 1. In 1975, these discussions
were removed to the Tokyo Round of Multinational Trade Negotiations. Id. Four years of
negotiations resulted in the Standards Code, the first international agreement to recognize
the importance of the effect of standards and certification systems on international trade. Id.
Several commentators have explained and analyzed the provisions of the Standards
Code. See generally Middleton, The GATT Standards Code, 14 J. WORLD TRADE L. 201
(1980); Note, Technical Analysis, supra, at 179; Note, Prospects for Implementation of the
GATT Standards Agreement in the United States, 20 VA. J. INT'L L. 699 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as Note, GATT Standards].
The legislation which implements the provisions of the Standards Code in the United
States is contained in Title IV of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2501-2582
(Supp. V 1981). For a discussion of this legislation, see International Trade Administration,
U.S. Dep't of Com., Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (June 1980). For the legisla-
tive history of Title IV of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, see S. REP'. No. 249, 96th Cong.,
1st. Sess. 148 (1979), reprinted ifi 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 534-38.
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tions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)2 in
2. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A5, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, (current version reprinted in 4 GENERAL
AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS (1969)
[hereinafter cited as GATT], is a multilateral agreement containing a body of rules designed
to regulate international trade. J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT § 1.3, at 9-
11 (1969); Graham, Results of the Tokyo Round, 9 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 153, 156 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Graham, Results of the Tokyo Round]. GATT is the principal forum
through which the over 80 signatories work to "reduce tariffs, eliminate nontariff measures,
and remove other trade obstacles." U.S. DEP'T OF COM., supra note 1, at iii.
Seven rounds of multilateral trade negotiations have been conducted pursuant to GATT.
Id. The most recent round of negotiations occurred in Geneva from 1973 through 1979. It is
commonly referred to as the "Tokyo Round" or the "MTN." Id. Negotiation rounds prior to
the Tokyo Round, especially the Kennedy Round, reduced tariff barriers. As tariff barriers
were reduced, the problem of nontariff barriers became more pronounced. Id. See NAT'L
AsS'N OF MFRS., A CLOSER LOOK AT NON-TARIFF BARRIERS 1, 9 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
NAM RFEORT]; Graham, Results of the Toyko Round, supra, at 159. Nontariff barriers to
trade (NTBs) include a wide variety of measures which serve to distort normal trade patterns.
See NAM REPORT, supra, at 10. NTBs are defined as any public or private measure, other
than conventional tariffs, that restrict imports or artificially stimulate exports. Cao, Non-
tariff Barriers to U.S. Manufactured Exports, 15 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 93, 93 (1980). The
major NTBs affecting international trade are: (1) specific limitations on trade, including
quotas, import licensing practices, restrictions on the proportion of foreign to domestic goods
used, minimum import price limits and embargoes; (2) customs and administrative entry
procedures, including valuation systems for incoming goods, anti-dumping practices, tariff
classifications, documentation requirements and fees; (3) standards which impede trade,
including disparities in existing and potential legislation and regulations on product stan-
dards, intergovernmental acceptance of testing methods and standards, and unreasonable
applications of standards, packaging, labeling and marking requirements; (4) government
participation in trade, including government procurement policies, export subsidies, counter-
vailing duties, and domestic assistance and investment programs; (5) charges on imports
other than regular tariff rates; and (6) rules of origin and domestic content requirements.
NAM REPORT, supra, at 10-13; Cao, supra, at 93-95.
The Tokyo Round, the "most comprehensive and far-reaching [yet,] ... resulted not
only in a significant reduction of world tariffs but also resulted in six major agreements
concerned with nontariff measures." U.S. DEP'T OF COM., supra note 1, at iii. Often referred
to as "Codes," id., these agreements lay out new international rules for: (1) subsidies and
countervailing measures, Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI
and XXIII, Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 513, T.I.A.S. No. 9619; (2) antidumping, Agreement on
Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 12, 1979,
31 U.S.T. 4919, T.I.A.S. No. 9650; (3) government procurement, Agreement on Govern-
ment Procurement, Apr. 12, 1979, - U.S.T. - , T.I.A.S. No. 10,403; (4) technical
barriers to trade, Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 405,
T.I.A.S. No. 9616; (5) customs valuation, Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, - U.S.T. - , T.I.A.S.
No. 10,402; and (6) import licensing, Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, Apr. 12,
1979, __ U.S.T. __ , T.I.A.S. No. 9788.
METAL BAT DISPUTE
an effort to eliminate the use of standards3 and certification sys-
tems4 as a barrier to trade.- United States-Japan consultations6
under the Standards Code resulted in the first settlement of a case
initiated under the dispute settlement provisions of the Code. 7 In
this Note, the dispute settlement case involving the marketing of
United States-made metal baseball bats in Japan will be examined.
The effectiveness of the Standards Code's dispute settlement proce-
dures" will be analyzed through an examination of the metal bat
3. See infra note 5 and accompanying text. For a definition of the term standard, see
supra note 1 and accompanying text.
4. See infra note 5 and accompanying text. For a definition of the term certification
system, see supra note 1 and accompanying text.
5. U.S. DEP'T OF COM., supra note 1, at 2. These barriers, called technical barriers to
trade, result when the application of technical regulations, standards, or certification systems
distorts international competition. Note, Technical Analysis, supra note 1, at 182. For
example,
[d]ifferences between nations' standards, testing and approval procedures, and
certification systems often have hindered the free flow of international commerce..
. . Furthermore, required testing and approval procedures, developed primarily for
domestic/regional use, can be conducted arbitrarily or in such a way as to increase
unnecessarily the expense of importers. Certification systems, which provide assur-
ance that products conform to standards, may, because of their internal orientation,
either limit access for imports or deny the right of a certification mark to imported
products.
U.S. DEP'T OF COM., supra note 1, at 1.
6. See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES
CONGRESS ON THE AGREEMENT ON TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE-"STANDARDS CODE" 15, 24-
32 (1983) [hereinafter cited as GREEN REPORT]. Title IV of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979,
19 U.S.C. § 2573 (Supp. V 1981), requires that a report on the domestic and international
operation of the Standards Code be supplied to Congress once every three years. Id. The
Green Report was prepared by the four United States agencies responsible for the Standards
Code: the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), the Department of
Agriculture, the Department of Commerce, and the Department of State. Id. See also infra
notes 32-41 and accompanying text (describing United States-Japan bilateral consultations
pursuant to the Standards Code).
Because of the sensitive nature of these international consultations and the fact that
issues initiated during these discussions have not yet been resolved, many government docu-
ments pertaining to the discussions between the United States and Japan concerning stan-
dards and certification systems have not been declassified. As a result, this Note does not
summarize all the issues that have been raised by the United States and Japan in these
consultations.
7. Standards Code, supra note 1, art. 14. For purposes of this Note, the term dispute
settlement procedures includes both bilateral consultation procedures and third party adjudi-
cation and mediation (i.e. panel and committee proceedings) under article 14 of the Stan-
dards Code. See infra notes 23-31 and accompanying text.
8. Several commentators consider only third party adjudication and mediation provi-
sions when analyzing dispute settlement procedures. See generally Graham, Reforming the
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case and its effect on Japan's standards laws and certification sys-
tems.
I. AGREEMENT ON TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE
A. Obligations of the Standards Code
Several of the obligations imposed on Standards Code signato-
riesg were involved in the metal bat case.' 0 One of these obligations
concerns the national treatment of imported goods." The Stan-
dards Code requires countries to provide the same treatment to
International Trading System: The Tokyo Round Trade Negotiations in the Final Stage, 12
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 28-30 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Graham, Reforming the Interna-
tional Trading System]; Graham, Results of the Tokyo Round, supra note 2, at 171; Address
by Robert E. Hudec (Apr. 17, 1980), reprinted in 1980 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L.: PROCEEDINGS 129,
129 (remarks by Robert E. Hudec, Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School,
during panel discussion of dispute settlement under the Multilateral Trade Negotiations).
9. Standards Code, supra note 1, arts. 2.1 (national treatment of imported products),
2.2 (use of international standards), 2.4 (design versus performance standards), 2.5 (open
procedures (transparency)), 5.1, 5.2 (product testing), 7.2 (access to certification systems),
10.1 (information and assistance). Regarding these substantive obligations,
[t]he Code addresses itself to governmental and nongovernmental standards, both
voluntary and mandatory, and certification systems which are developed by central
governments, state and local governments and private sector organizations. How-
ever, only central governments are directly bound by the obligations in the Code,
since the Code states that signatories "shall ensure that" central government bodies
comply fully with the provisions of the agreement.
With repect to regional, state, local and private organizations, the Code states
that the signatories "shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to
them" to ensure compliance. The nature of such reasonable measures is left to the
discretion of each individual signatory to determine within the context of its domes-
tic political and legal system. Regional, state, local and private organizations are
therefore subject to a "second" level of obligation, as compared to central govern-
ments who are bound by the "first" level of obligation. However, it should be
pointed out that a signatory can be brought to a dispute settlement or enforcement
case by another signatory if, for example, the standards-related activity of a non-
central governmental or private body within its territory is creating an unnecessary
barrier to international trade.
U.S. DEP'T OF COM., supra note 1, at 3.
10. See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
11. Standards Code, supra note 1, art. 2.1. According to the Standards Code:
Parties shall ensure that technical regulations and standards are not prepared,
adopted or applied with a view to creating obstacles to international trade. Further-
more, products imported from the territory of any Party shall be accorded treat-
ment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin and to
like products originating In any other country in relation to such technical regula-
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imported products as is given to domestic products "with regard to
standards, technical regulations, certification and testing."' 2 This
national treatment obligation is an extension of the national treat-
ment clause in GATT,13 "which prohibits a country from discrimi-
nating against imported products.' 4 The Standards Code makes
this obligation more specific "by stating that a country should not,
in its application of standards, testing procedures, certification
rules, etc., discriminate against imported products."' 15
Another Standards Code obligation related to the metal bat
dispute concerns access to certification systems.' 6 According to the
Standards Code, each signatory must ensure that certification sys-
tems are "formulated and applied" so as to grant access to foreign
suppliers under conditions no less favorable than those accorded to
domestic suppliers or other foreign suppliers. 17 This obligation,
which applies to both national and regional certification systems,
opens such systems to participation on an equal basis by all Code
signatories.' Signatories may no longer refuse to give national certi-
fication marks to imported products that meet the technical re-
quirements of the certification system.' 9 In addition, regional certi-
fication bodies must be open to suppliers from all signatories. 20
B. Dispute Settlement Provisions
Article 14.1 of the Standards Code provides that every signa-
tory which believes that another signatory has violated the Code
tions or standards. They shall likewise ensure that neither technical regulations nor
standards themselves nor their application have the affect of creating unnecessary
obstacles to international trade.
Id.
12. GREEN REPORT, supra note 6, at 5; U.S. DEP'T OF COM., supra note 1, at 4.
13. GATT, supra note 2, art. 3.
14. GREEN REPoRT, supra note 6, at 5; U.S. DEP'T OF COM., supra note 1, at 4.
15. GREEN REPORT, supra note 6, at 5; U.S. DEP'T OF COM., supra note 1, at 4.
16. Standards Code, supra note 1, art. 7.2. The Code states:
Parties shall ensure that certification systems are formulated and applied so as to
grant access for suppliers of like products originating in the territories of other
Parties under conditions no less favourable than those accorded to suppliers of like
products of national origin or originating in any other country, including the




18. GREEN REPo-r, supra note 6, at 6; U.S. DEP'T OF COM., supra note 1, at 4.
19. GREEN REPoRT, supra note 6, at 6; U.S. DEP'T OF COM., supra note 1, at 4.
20. GREEN REPORT, supra note 6, at 6; U.S. DEP'T OF COM., supra note 1, at 4.
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may request bilateral consultations. 21 If these consultations do not
result in a solution acceptable to both parties, the complaining
signatory must provide a written copy of the allegations to the other
party 22 If additional consultations based on the written allegations
do not produce an acceptable solution,2 3 either party to the dispute
may request an investigation by the Committee on Technical Barri-
ers to Trade.2 4 The Committee must meet to investigate the matter
within thirty days of receipt of such request. 25 If the Committee
cannot reach a satisfactory solution to the dispute within three
months, either party may petition the Committee to establish
a technical expert group,26 a panel of trade policy experts,27 or
21. Standards Code, supra note 1, art. 14.1. "Each Party shall afford sympathetic
consideration to and adequate opportunity for prompt consultation regarding representations
made by other Parties with respect to any matter affecting the operation of this Agreement."
Id. The United States has participated in many bilateral consultations under this provision.
See GREEN REPoT, supra note 6, at 15-32 (these bilateral consultations have involved
countries such as Japan, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the United King-
dom).
22. Standards Code, supra note 1, art. 14.2. To invoke article 14.2, a signatory must
assert that some benefit due the signatory under the Agreement is being "nullified or im-
paired, or that the attainment of any objective of this Agreement is being impeded, by
another Party or Parties, and that its trade interests are significantly affected." Id. One
commentator claims that this nullified or impaired benefit standard is too subjective. The
Sixth Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,
84 F.R.D. 429, 595 (1979) (session discussing reform of the international trading system,
mainly dispute settlement) (remarks by Daniel Tarullo, Antitrust Foreign Commerce Divi-
sion, Department of Justice) [hereinafter cited as Judicial Conference of Customs and Patent
Appeals]. Tarullo contends that the dispute settlement procedures of the Code should be
triggered by any violation of the substantive provisions of the Code. Id.
23. Standards Code, supra note 1, art. 14.4.
24. Id. The Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, composed of all the signatory
countries, meets at least once a year to consult "on any matters relating to the operation of
[the Code] or the furtherance of its objectives." Id. art. 13.1; see U.S. DEP'T OF COM., supra
note 1, at 7. If a signatory requests an investigation of a dispute by the Committee, the
investigation must proceed "with a view to facilitating a mutually satisfactory solution."
Standards Code, supra note 1, art. 14.4.
25. Standards Code, supra note 1, art. 14.4.
26. Id. art. 14.9. Participation in technical expert groups is restricted to persons,
preferably government officials, of professional standing in the field in question. Id. annex 2.
If no mutually satisfactory solution is reached after the use of a technical expert group, either
party to the dispute may request that the Committee establish a panel. Id. art. 14.13.
27. Id. art. 14.14. The use of a panel of trade policy experts is appropriate where either
the dispute does not involve a technical issue or where a technical expert group has failed to
reach a mutually satisfactory solution. U.S. DEP'T OF COM., supra note 1, at 8. The Code
recommends that the panel deliver its findings to the Committee within four months after it
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both. 28 After the report of the technical expert group or panel is
presented, the Committee should take action within a thirty-day
period. 29 If the Committee determines that a party's actions were in
violation of the Code, and its recommendations are not followed
within a reasonable period of time, the Committee may authorize
appropriate retaliatory counter-measures against the offending
party. 30 These counter-measures include suspension of the nonof-
fending parties' obligations under the Standards Code.
31
C. United States-Japan Bilateral Consultations
Following numerous conflicts concerning standards-related issues, 32
the United States and Japan negotiated and agreed upon a "Joint
is established. Standards Code, supra note 1, art. 14.18. A description of the panel's report
and at least an outline of its conclusions are submitted to the parties to the dispute before
being circulated to the Committee so that the parties might reach a mutually satisfactory
solution. Id. annex 3; see U.S. DEP'T OF COM., supra note 1, at 8-9. If no resolution is
reached, the panel's report is circulated to the Committee. Id. at 9.
28. Standards Code, supra note 1, art. 14.19.
29. Id. Such action includes "a statement concerning the facts of the matter; or recom-
mendations to one or more Parties; or any other ruling which it deems appropriate." Id.
30. Standards Code, supra note 1, art. 14.21. See U.S. DEF'T OF COM., supra note 1, at
9.
31. Id. The Code states,
If the Committee considers that the circumstances are serious enough to justify such
action, it may authorize one or more Parties to suspend, in respect of any other
Party, the application of such obligations under this Agreement as it determines to
be appropriate in the circumstances. In this respect, the Committee may, inter alia,
authorize the suspension of the application of obligations, including those in Articles
5 to 9, in order to restore mutual economic advantage and balance of rights and
obligations.
Id. See U.S. DEs'T OF COM., supra note 1, at 9.
32. GREEN REl'ORT, supra note 6, at 21. These problems involved access to certification
systems, procedures for obtaining official approval, input during the development of stan-
dards, acceptance of test data generated in the United States, and ability to appeal standards
determinations by the Japanese government. Id. A number of theories attempt to explain
Japan's restrictive trade practices, including the standards-related activities which violate the
Code. One theory is that Japan's restrictive trade practices are a consequence of its historic
development. See Weil & Glick, Japan-Is the Market Open? A View of the Japanese Market
Drawn From U.S. Corporate Experience, 11 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 845, 849 (1979). Four
important factors in Japan's historic development have contributed to the creation of restric-
tive trade practices. Id. One factor is Japan's early desire to limit trade with the outside
world. From the 17th through the 19th centuries, the leaders of Japan's feudal society isolated
Japan from the rest of the world and permitted only very limited trade with other countries.
Id. at 850. Another factor is the cautious and suspicious reaction by the Japanese to foreign
control, evident in the strict limitations on foreign ownership in Japan. Id, at 849, 851. The
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Statement on Standards, Testing and Certification Activities. '33
The Joint Statement led to a series of bilateral consultations be-
tween the United States and Japan aimed at reducing the technical
barriers to trade created by Japan's standards and certification
practices. 34 As a result of these consultations, Japan announced
third factor is "the severe centralization of economic power in large business combinations
and trading companies" in Japan. Id. at 849, 852-54. This concentration of economic power
may limit a foreign company's ability to sell products in Japan, "because business ethics
prevent a trading company from marketing competing products." Id. at 854. The fourth
factor is "a strong link between the interests and structures of Japanese business and govern-
ment." Id. at 849.
To protect the public from dangerous or defective products, the Government of Japan
has devised extremely strict standards and testing requirements. U.S.-JAPAN TRADE STUDY
GROUP, A SPECIAL PROGESS REPORT 5 (Apr. 1980) [hereinafter cited as TSG REPORT]. The
Japanese claim that these restrictive practices are necessary because of Japan's concern for
product liability of imported products. See GREEN REPORT, supra note 6, at 19. For an
explanation of product liability in Japan and the effect of government safety regulations on
product liabilty, see J. LAMBERT, MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS AND PRODUCT LIABILITY
IN JAPAN 13-16 (The Economist Intelligence Unit Special Report No. 129, Aug. 1982)
[hereinafter cited as EIU REPORT]; K. Arita, Product Liability in Japanese Law: Principles
and Cases 4, 89 (unpublished manuscript) (available at the offices of the Fordham Interna-
tional Law Journal).
Another theory is that these restrictive practices result because foreign producers lack the
knowledge and experience necessary to function in Japan's standards system. TSG REPORT,
supra, at 5. While Japanese standards and technical regulations are strict, the government
officials who administer these regulations have broad discretion to relax these regulations in
certain cases. Id. Foreign producers, who do not understand this system and do not have the
connections with government officials necessary to operate in this system, are at a disadvan-
tage as compared to Japanese producers. Id. In addition, the tremendous discretion given to
Japanese government officials in administering the standards system has resulted in cases
where an official's restrictive interpretation of a regulation has created a barrier to trade.
Wel & Glick, supra, at 862-65.
A final explanation for Japan's restrictive trade practices is that the Japanese language
itself creates standards which act as barriers to trade. See EIU REPORT, supra, at 2. The
difficulty of translating written laws from Japanese to English often results in the misinter-
pretation of these laws by the United States. Klein, Firms Seek Aid in Deciphering Japan's
Culture, Wall St. J., Sept. 1, 1983, at 27, col. 3.
33. Government of Japan & Government of the United States Joint Statement on
Standards, Testing and Certification Activities (Dec. 7, 1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 Joint
Statement], reprinted in GREEN REPORT, supra note 6, at 53-57 app. (1983). The basic
principles of the 1979 Joint Statement include an agreement on mutual acceptance of test
data, the use of open procedures when developing new standards, nondiscriminatory treat-
ment of applications for product approval, availability of an appeals procedure, and specifi-
cation of standards in terms of performance rather than design criteria. Id. The 1979 Joint
Statement also required consultations between the United States and Japan concerning the
the issues listed above. Id.
34. GREEN REPORT, supra note 6, at 20. For the first round of discussions, the United
States presented to Japan a list of twelve issues for bilateral consultations. However, discus-
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three packages of trade liberalization measures. 35 Despite this pro-
sions were held on only four of these issues. Id. The four issues were motor vehicles,
telecommunications interconnect equipment, electrical appliances and small boats. Id.
At the next round of discussions, held in Toyko on July 29 and 30, 1980, the United
States initiated bilateral discussions with Japan on three additional specific product issues:
cosmetics, processed foods and agricultural chemicals. See GREEN REPORT, supra note 6, at
20; Dep't of State Telegram No. 190,084 from the United States Secretary of State, Washing-
ton, D.C. to the United States Embassy, Toyko (July 19, 1980) (all telegrams cited in this
Note are available at the Office of the United States Trade Representative, Washington,
D.C.).
35. The first package is contained in a report entitled MINISTERIAL CONF. FOR ECON.
MEAsusS, ON THE IMPROVEMENT OF IMPORT TESTING PROcEouREs, ETC. (Jan. 30, 1982) (prov.
trans.) (available at the Office of the United States Trade Representative, Washington, D.C.)
[hereinafter cited as January Package]. The January Package addresses 99 nontariff trade
barriers which the United States and other signatories had complained of to Japan. Id. at 3-1.
The package covers general areas, such as examination procedures, documentation require-
ments, and specific product issues, such as athletic equipment, agricultural chemicals, elec-
trical appliances, medical devices, motor vehicles, pharmaceuticals, pressure vessels, proc-
essed foods, sake, and cosmetics. Id. Bilateral discussions concerning the January Package
were held in Tokyo during the week of February 15, 1982. Dep't of State Telegram No.
033,818 from the United States Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., to the United States
Embassy, Tokyo (Feb. 9, 1982).
The January Package was considered a compilation of measures already undertaken by
various Japanese Government agencies, and narrowly focused on standards and import
procedures. Statement of Ambassador W. Brock, United States Trade Representative, before
the Subcomm. on International Economic Policy and Trade and on Asian and Pacific Affairs
of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (June 15, 1982) (available
from Office of the United States Trade Representative, Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter cited
as Brock June 15 Statement]. However, the May 28, 1982 package was considered a major
step toward the reduction of tariff and nontariff barriers which prevented access to Japanese
markets. Dep't of State Telegram No. 146,783 from the Secretary of State, Washington,
D.C., to the United States Embassy, Tokyo (May 28, 1982). The May package addresses the
issue of transparency (open procedures) in standards development. See GREEN REP RT, supra
note 6, at 21. Under the May package, qualified foreigners will be allowed to participate
with the Japanese in the formation of new standards for products. Agress, Japan Issues New
Trade Package, Bus. AM., June 14, 1982, at 10-12. United States-Japan bilateral discussions
were held in August, November and December, 1982 concerning the May package's trade
liberalization measures. Memorandum from Donald S. Abelson, Office of the United States
Trade Representative 1-9 (Aug. 16, 1982) (discussing the May 1982 Japan trade package)
(available at the Office of the United States Trade Representative, Washington, D.C.).
The May package also discusses other standards-related issues involving medical devices,
GREEN REPORT, supra note 6, at 21, and two new issues concerning processed foods and
Japanese certification practices regarding certain products. Latest Talks Fail to Resolve
Disputes But Concrete Reply Promised By Jan. 1, 18 U.S. Exp. WEEKLY (BNA) 392, 393 (Dec.
7, 1982) (electrical appliances); Dep't of State Telegram No. 070,039 from the United States
Information Service, Tokyo, to the United States Secretary of State, Washington, D.C. 1
(Dec. 7, 1982) (metal baseball bats); Dep't of State Telegram No. 070,019 from the United
States Information Service, Tokyo, to the United States Secretary of State, Washington, D.C.
1 (Dec. 6, 1982) (motor vehicles).
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gress, the bilateral consultations left several problems unresolved.
36
The problem areas relevant to the metal bat dispute include access
to Japanese certification systems, 37 procedures for obtaining Japa-
nese government approval to market products, 38 foreign input in
Another package of trade liberalization measures was issued by Japan in January, 1983.
See Letter from Donald S. Abelson, Office of the United States Trade Representative, to
Jaxon White, Senior Vice President, Health Industry Manufacturers Association (Jan. 14,
1983) (available at the Office of the United States Trade Representative, Washington, D.C.)
[hereinafter cited as Jan. 14 Letter]. One part of this package established a committee to
review 30 Japanese laws dealing with standards, import testing and certification practices,
Jan. 14 Letter, supra, at encl. 8-9. (statement of Prime Minister Nakasone, Japan, on the
Promotion of External Economic Measures), for the purpose of providing foreign firms the
same treatment as domestic Japanese firms, thereby improving access to Japan's markets.
Dep't of State Telegram No. 012,741 from the United States Secretary of State, Washington,
D.C., to the United States Embassy, Tokyo 1 (Jan. 15, 1983) (statement by Ambassador
Brock regarding Japanese trade announcement of January 13, 1983). This review led to the
May 18, 1983 revisions of 17 Japanese laws dealing with standards and certification systems.
See infra notes 97-104 and accompanying text.
36. See GREEN REPORT, supra note 6, at 21.
37. Id. Under certain Japanese laws, including the Consumer Product Safety Law, No.
31 of 1973 (Japan), the Electrical Appliance and Material Control Law, No. 234 of 1961
(Japan), the Pharmaceutical Affairs Law, No. 145 of 1960 (Japan), the Road Vehicles Act,
No. 105 of 1960 (Japan), and the High Pressure Gas Control Law, No. 204 of 1951 (Japan)
(copies of Japanese laws cited in this Note available through Japan Trade Center, New York,
New York), the United States suppliers of such products as metal bats, pressure vessels,
pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, medical devices, electrical appliances, automobiles, and air
conditioners are not provided access to Japanese Government and private certification sys-
tems under conditions as favorable as those provided to Japanese suppliers. Such restrictions
on access to certification systems violate the Standards Code obligation to provide equal
access to certification systems. Standards Code, supra note 1, art. 7.2. See GRiN REPOrT,
supra note 6, at 21. For example, as a result of Japan's concern for product liability, and
misuse of certification marks, Japanese certification systems prevent foreign suppliers, includ-
ing Americans, from having their plants inspected and from receiving product type approval
(government approval to market the product). See id. at 19, 22. This prevents foreign
manufacturers from complying with Japanese specifications for products through the self-
certification method. See id. at 22. Self-certification occurs when foreign manufacturers,
whose factories are registered by the importing nation and who have legal ownership of
certification marks (marks indicating that the product satisfies given mandatory or voluntary
standards), are permitted to affix the certification marks to the products at their factories. See
id. Factory registration usually requires on-site factory inspection by government officials,
government type approval of products and agreement on product liability insurance. Id. In
contrast, foreigners are subject to costly dockside inspections, referred to as "lot inspection
systems," which may be carried out in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner. Id.
38. GREEN REPORT, supra note 6, at 21. Once United States producers have access to
certification systems, obtaining product type approval is more difficult for foreign manufac-
turers than for Japanese producers of automobiles and electrical appliances. Id. at 22-23.
Another related problem is that once product type approval is given, a foreign producer must
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the development of Japanese standards, 39 acceptance by Japan of
foreign test data, 40 and appeals of Japanese government standards-
related determinations .41
IH. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEEDINGS
The United States has initiated two dispute settlement pro-
ceedings under the Standards Code during the three years that it
has been in effect. 42 The first proceeding involving a process for the
chilling of poultry, will not be discussed in this Note. 43 The second
case involved an attempt by United States manufacturers to market
metal baseball bats in Japan.
work through a Japanese agent in order to market a product in Japan. Id. at 23. The agent
then legally gains proprietary rights to important information concerning the product's
manufacturing. Id.
39. Id. at 21. This problem was dealt with by Japan's May 28, 1982 package of trade
liberalization measures. See supra note 35 and acompanying text. However, the extent to
which these measures solve the problems concerning the development of Japanese standards
depends on how the May package is implemented. See Brock June 15 Statement, supra note
35, at 6.
40. GREEN REPORT, supra note 6, at 21. United States producers are frequently forced to
repeat product tests in Japan that have already been completed in the United States. This
occurs because the Japanese will not accept test data generated in the United States. Id. at 23.
Product areas involved include pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, automobiles and medical de-
vices. Id.
41. Id. at 21. United States producers have experienced problems with arbitrary deci-
sions made during dock side inspections of products such as processed food, automobiles,
cosmetics and pleasure craft. Id. at 24. Unfortunately, the judgment of low level Japanese
bureaucrats during these lot inspections appears to be final. Id. However, the Japanese Office
of Trade Ombudsman, established by the January 30, 1982 trade liberalization package,
supra note 35 and accompanying text, may lead to an effective appeals process for these dock
side inspection decisions. GaEEN REPORT, supra note 6, at 24.
42. GREEN REPoRT, supra note 6, at 14.
43. See Memorandum from Tom O'Connell, United States Dep't of Agriculture, to Don
Abelson, Office of the United States Trade Representative 2 (May 11, 1982) (discussing the
process and production method dispute) [hereinafter cited as O'Connell Memorandum] (all
memoranda cited in this Note are available at the Office of the United States Trade Repre-
sentative, Washington, D.C.). The United States issued a complaint under the Standards
Code against the Commission of European Countries and the United Kingdom concerning a
process and production method requirement for the immersion chilling of poultry. Id. Process
and production methods (PPMs) are "any product related requirement which establishes
design criteria for manufacturing, processing or production practices to ensure the accept-
ability of a final product." Letter from Andrew L. Stoler, Office of the United States Trade
Representative, Geneva, to F. Roessler, GATT Secretariat, Geneva 1 end. (Feb. 26, 1982).
The United States claimed that a European Community directive, which required the use of
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A. The Metal Baseball Bat Dispute
United States manufacturers have attempted to sell metal bats
in Japan since the early 1970's. 44 In order to market metal baseball
bats in Japan, every manufacturer must affix to the bats the man-
datory government "S" certification mark,45 the "SG" insurance
counterflow immersion of poultry, created an unnecessary barrier to trade in violation of the
Standards Code. See O'Connell Memorandum, supra, at 2. The United States also claimed
that the United Kingdom discriminated against United States poultry producers in applying
this directive. Id. Although this problem was the subject of bilateral consultations, GREEN
REPORT, supra note 6, at 14, the discussions did not resolve the issue, but instead generated a
controversy in the interpretation of article 14.25 of the Code. Standards Code, supra note 1,
art. 14.25. See GREEsN REPoRT, supra note 6, at 11-12; Letter from Nancy E. Morgan, Acting
Director, GATT Affairs Division, United States Dep't of Com. to Jerry Steinpres, Executive
Vice President, Shenandoah Valley Poultry Co. (July 1, 1982) (available at the Office of the
United States Trade Representative, Washington, D.C.); See O'Connell Memorandum,
supra, at 2. The United States, along with a minority of the signatories, contend that under
article 14.25 of the Standards Code, PPM requirements can be the subject of dispute settle-
ment procedures where these methods violate provisions of the Code. GREEN REPORT, supra
note 6, at 12. A majority of the signatories, including the Commission of the European
Communities, contend that PPM requirements are not subject to the Code's dispute settle-
ment provisions "unless intentionally used to bypass Code obligations." Id.
44. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1981, § 3, at 17, col. 1. The first metal bats sold in Japan
were made by United States manufacturers. They were introduced in Japan in the early
1970's and were sold through Japanese distributors. See id. By the mid-1970's, however,
Japanese manufacturers were producing and selling metal bats. Id. Japan adopted standards
and certification procedures for metal bats after a person was seriously injured in an accident
involving a metal bat. Dep't of State Telegram No. 00615 from American Consulate, Osaka-
Kobe, to the United States Secretary of State, Washington, D.C. 2 (May 10, 1983) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Telegram No. 00615]. The application of these standards and certification
procedures forced United States manufacturers out of Japan's metal bat market. Id. Japan's
metal bat market has continually expanded since the mid-1970's. Sales in that market are
now estimated at U.S.$30,000,000 per year. Letter from Herbert A. Cochran, Commercial
Officer, Consulate General of the United States, Osaka-Kobe, to Maryanne Mascoline-Esser,
Sporting Goods Manufacturers' Association (SGMA) 3 (Aug. 17 1981) (discussing JSBB
approval for metal bats) [hereinafter cited as Aug. 17 Letter] (all letters cited in this Note are
available at the Office of the United States Trade Representative, Washington, D.C.).
45. Consumer Product Safety Law, No. 31 of 1973 (Japan). Under the Consumer
Product Safety Law, metal bats are required to have "S" (safety) marks to show that they
have met safety standards. Letter from Herbert A. Cochran, Commercial Officer, Consulate
General of the United States, Osaka-Kobe, to Maryanne Mascoline-Esser, SGMA 1 encl.
(May 14, 1982) [hereinafter cited as May 14 Letter]. The two ways of receiving "S" mark
approval are through the factory inspection system and the lot inspection system. See Dep't of
State Telegram No. 260,133 from American Consulate, Osaka-Kobe, to United States Mis-
sion, Geneva 4 (May 26, 1982) (discussing Standards Code consultations with Japan on
athletic equipment) [hereinafter cited as Telegram No. 260,133]; infra note 63 and accompa-
nying text.
1984] METAL BAT DISPUTE
mark,46  and the Japanese Rubberized Baseball League (JSBB)47
approval mark. 48 On May 30, 1980, pursuant to the Standards
Code and the United States-Japan Joint Statement on Standards, a
United States government official asked the JSBB to provide infor-
mation on standards and procedures for official approval of metal
baseball bats. 49 In response, the JSBB stated that "no foreign bats
were allowed to receive official approval. "50 This denial of access to
Japan's certification systems, which appeared to violate article 7.2
of the Code, 5' prompted the United States to raise the JSBB certifi-
cation issue with Japan under the Standards Code.52 In an effort to
46. May 14 Letter, supra note 45, at 1 encl. "Also under the Consumer Product Safety
Law, provision is made for manufacturers to put 'SG' marks (SG: safety goods) on bats to
show there is a compensation system (product liability compensation system) for damages or
injury due to any defects of products bearing the 'SG' mark." Id. "The SC mark on metal bats
shows consumers that the manufacturer belongs to the Product Safety Association liability
insurance system. If the bat is defective and injures someone while in use, liability insurance
payments, up to a certain limit, will be made by the Product Safety Association." Telegram
No. 260,133, supra note 45, at 2. The safety standards and testing methods for receiving the
"SG" mark are the same as those for receiving the "S" mark. May 14 Letter, supra note 45, at
1, encl.
47. The JSBB governs 1.6 million players or 85% of organized amateur baseball players
in Japan. The JSBB requires that the JSBB stamp of approval must be affixed to the bat
before it can be used in a league game. N.Y. Times, supra note 44, at 17.
48. Telegram No. 00615, supra note 44, at 2, 4.
49. Telegram No. 260,133, supra note 45, at 4.
50. Id. Between April and June, 1981, several United States bat manufacturers re-
quested information from the JSBB concerning standards and certification procedures. Id. at
5. The JSBB told the manufacturers that it would not approve foreign made bats. Letter from
Shinzo Fukuda, Secretary-General, JSBB League Headquarters, Tokyo, to Joe Johnston,
Executive Vice President, Easton Aluminum (July 8, 1981) (available at the Office of the
United States Trade Representative, Washington, D.C.). The JSBB only granted its approval
mark to six Japanese manufactures, claiming that the bat market was saturated. Dep't of
State Telegram No. 011,541 from United States Dep't of Com. to United States Consulate,
Osaka-Kobe 1 (July 1, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Telegram No. 011,541]. An executive of one
of the six Japanese manufacturers admitted that the purpose of the approval mark is to limit
competition. N.Y. Times, supra note 44, at 17, col. 1.
51. Standards Code, supra note 1, art. 7.2.
52. See Dep't of State Telegram No. 129,477 from the United States Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C., to the United States Mission, Geneva 1 (May 13, 1982) [hereinafter cited
as Telegram No. 129,477]. In July, 1981, United States representatives in Geneva and Tokyo
Informally raised the issue of access to certification systems for athletic equipment, especially
metal bats. Id. On July 31, 1981, a United States Government representative to GATT made
written representations under article 14.2 to a Japanese official. Aug. 17 Letter, supra note
44, at 1. The United States Government asserted that the JSBB refusal to grant foreign
manufacturers approval marks was a denial of access to certification systems under conditions
no less favorable than those accorded to domestic suppliers, in violation of article 7.2 of the
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settle the Standards Code claim, the Government of Japan and the
JSBB devised new standards for metal bats.53 The new JSBB stan-
dards contained two design criteria5 4 which violated the Standards
Code. 55 The Code requires that product standards be based on
performance criteria. 5 The JSBB design standards, in addition to
problems of access to Japan's certification systems for other athletic
products, 57 prompted the United States to request bilateral consul-
tations with Japan under the Standards Code.58
Prior to the consultations, the JSBB announced its intention to
revoke all standards pertaining to metal bats.5 In addition, the
May 28, 1982 trade package60 required the JSBB to take measures
Standards Code. Telegram No. 011,541, supra note 50, at 1. The United States assumed that
the JSBB was a nongovernmental body, and accordingly, the application of Article 8.1 of the
Code was appropriate. Id.
53. Dep't of State Telegram No. 18,839 from the American Embassy, Tokyo, to the
United States Secretary of State, Washington, D.C. 1 (Oct. 15, 1981). The JSBB amended its
procedures and extended its approval mark to foreign manufacturers. Id. The Japanese
Government abolished its then existing technical regulation for metal bats and replaced it
with a new regulation. Id. To be used in Japan, a bat must meet this new regulation, and
must bear the "S" mark to show that this mandatory standard is met. Id. The JSBB adopted
technical regulations for metal bats similar to the new mandatory government standards
required for the "S" mark. Id.
54. Memorandum from Don Abelson, Office of the United States Trade Representative,
to Jim Murphy, Office of the United States Trade Representative 1 (Apr. 26, 1982) (available
at the Office of the United States Trade Representative, Washington, D.C.). The new JSBB
standard requires manufacturers to use an aluminum alloy not made in the United States. Id.
The substitute alloy is weaker than the material used by United States manufacturers. See
Wash. Post, May 8, 1982, at Cl, col. 1. The new design criteria also require rubber plugs in
the end of the bats. Id. United States producers do not use rubber plugs because they can fly
off under certain circumstances and injure bystanders. Id.
55. Standards Code, supra note 1, art. 2.4.
56. Id.
57. Telegram No. 129,477, supra note 52, at 1. These products included tennis balls,
inflatable balls, and gymnastic equipment. Id.
58. Id. The United States claimed that the Japanese sporting associations were prepar-
ing, adopting and applying standards for the purpose of creating obstacles to trade, basing
their specifications on design criteria rather than performance criteria in inappropriate
situations and formulating and applying their certification systems so as to create obstacles to
trade in violation of articles 2.1, 2.4, and 7.1 of the Code. Id. See Standards Code, supra note
1, arts. 2.1, 2.4, 7.1; infra notes 159-61, 176-77, 169-70 and accompanying text.
59. See Letter from Kensaku Hogen, Counselor, Embassy of Japan, to Maria Dennison,
SGMA (May 21, 1982) (available at the Office of the United States Trade Representative,
Washington, D.C) [hereinafter cited as May 21 Letter].
60. See upra note 35 and accompanying text.
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that would "facilitate official approval procedures for foreign prod-
ucts." 6' As a result, the JSBB stated that it would give its recom-
mendation mark to bats that received the mandatory "S" mark.6 2
However, the "S" mark was not given to foreign producers on the
same basis as it was given to Japanese producers.6 3 Thus, United
States manufacturers were still denied equal access to Japan's certi-
fication systems for metal bats6 4 in violation of article 7.2 of the
61. Letter from Andrew L. Stoler, Trade Attache, Office of the United States Trade
Representative, to Toshiaki Tanabe, Permanent Mission of Japan, Geneva (Aug. 4, 1982)
(available at the Office of the United States Trade Representative, Washington, D.C.)
[hereinafter cited as Aug. 4 Letter].
62. May 21 Letter, supra note 59, at 1.
63. Aug. 4 Letter, supra note 61, at 1. Under the Consumer Product Safety Law, No. 31
of 1973 (Japan), the two methods of receiving the "S" approval mark are the factory
inspection system and the lot inspection system. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
Under the factory inspection system, a manufacturer must have its factory inspected before
receiving the "S" mark and annually thereafter. See Telegram No. 260,133, supra note 45, at
2. The manufacturer must also participate in a model approval test of three bats. Following
completion of these procedures, a manufacturer may self-test and self-certify its products for
compliance with standards regulations and apply the "S" marks to them. Id. Under the
factory inspection system, the manufacturer has legal ownership of the certification ("S")
mark and is liable for the misuse of such mark. GREr REPORT, supra note 6, at 22. Under the
lot inspection system, a certain number of bats from each shipment are inspected as they
arrive at the dock in Japan. See Telegram No. 260,133, supra note 45, at 2. If they pass the
inspection, all the bats are unpacked, the "S" mark is affixed to every bat, and the bats then
may be sold in Japan. If the sample bats do not pass the inspection, all the bats in the lot are
returned to the manufacturer. Id.
64. Dep't of Com. Telegram No. 031,387 from United States Consulate, Osaka-Kobe,
to the United States Secretary of State, Washington D.C. 1 (June 8, 1982). On June 4, 1982,
the Easton Aluminum Company's application to register under the factory inspection system
was denied by Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). Id. MITI stated
that "non-Japanese firms could not receive the same treatment as Japanese firms under the
then existing Consumer Product Safety Law." Id. For each "S" mark issued, "the company
pays a fee, which is pooled with other such payments to underwrite product liability
insurance for metal bats." N.Y. Times, June 20, 1982, § 3, at 17, col. 1. Manufacturers that
use the factory inspection system pay the insurance fees themselves, and assume the liability
for defective bats. Id. For foreign producers forced to use the lot inspection system, the
Japanese importing company pays the insurance fee and assumes the liability. Id. MITI told
Easton that foreign producers are not allowed to participate in the product liability system,
and thus use the factory inspection system, "because Japan's Consumer Product Safety Law
does not provide for punishment of foreign companies for violations of the law. Because the
law cannot be enforced on an American company, factory inspection of its bats would give it
an unfair advantage over its Japanese competitors." Id. Instead, MITI told Easton to use the
lot inspection system to obtain the "S" mark. See Aug. 4 Letter, supra note 61, at 2. The
United States claimed that requiring lot inspection for foreign goods places them at a
competitive disadvantage as compared to Japanese products. Id.
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Standards Code.65 To resolve the problem, the Government of
Japan made an informal proposal to the United States which pro-
vided that United States manufacturers would be given certifica-
tion mark stickers to affix to their metal bats before shipping.86 The
bats would be subject to spot-check lot inspections once they arrived
in Japan.6 7 The United States rejected this "modified lot inspection
system" because United States manufacturers would still be denied
equal access to Japan's factory inspection (certification) system.68
After rejecting the proposal, the United States requested bilateral
consultations with Japan in accordance with article 14.169 of the
Standards Code. 70
The consultations were held in Tokyo in August of 1982.71 Not
satisfied with the results,72 the United States gave Japan a written
65. Standards Code, supra note 1, art. 7.2. Under the lot inspection system, dock
inspections can be arbitrary, time consuming, burdensome and costly. See GREEN REPORT,
supra note 6, at 22; Telegram No. 260,133, supra note 45, at 1. In addition, United States
manufacturers cannot deal directly with Japanese Government approval bodies, nor do they
acquire ownership of the certification marks which is necessary to self-certify compliance
with Japanese standards. See GaEN REPORT, supra note 6, at 22.
66. Dep't of State Telegram No. 216,101 from the United States Secretary of State to the
United States Mission, Geneva 1 (Aug. 3, 1982).
67. Id.
68. See td. at 1-2. The United States manufacturers would prefer a factory inspection
system where MITI chose as an inspector a United States testing concern, such as Underwrit-
ers' Laboratory. Id. at 2.
69. Standards Code, supra note 1, art. 14.1. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
70. See Aug. 4 Letter, supra note 61, at 2. The United States claimed that Japan had
violated article 7.2 of the Standards Code, supra note 1, art. 7.2, which requires Japan to
provide United States manufacturers with the same access to certification systems as is
provided to Japanese producers. Id.
71. Dep't of State Telegram No. 13,634 from the United States Embassy, Tokyo, to the
United States Secretary of State, Washington, D.C. 1 (Aug. 10, 1982). Japan argued that the
discussions were informal and not official consultations as provided for under article 14.1.
The United States stated that the consultations occurred "under the Standards Code," with-
out referring to a specific provision of the Code. Id. The United States claimed that the
Japanese government's practice of denying United States manufacturers access to the factory
registration system "led to nullification and impairment" of benefits accruing to the United
States under the Code. Id. See Standards Code, supra note 1, art. 14.2. The United States
was denied the Code benefit of equal access to certification systems guaranteed by article 7.2.
See Standards Code, supra note 1, art. 7.2.
72. Letter from Andrew L. Stoler, Trade Attache, Office of the United States Trade
Representative, Geneva to Katsuro Shinzeki, Permanent Mission of Japan, Geneva (Sept. 7,
1982) (available at the Office of the United States Trade Representative, Washington, D.C.)
[hereinafter cited as Sept. 7 Letter].
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copy of its allegations73 as required by article 14.2 of the Code.7 4
Pursuant to article 14.4 of the Standards Code,7 5 the United States
formally requested the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade76
on September 17, 1982 to investigate Japanese certification prac-
tices "based on the example of Japanese treatment of U.S. alumi-
num softball bats."'77 Shortly thereafter, the Sporting Goods Manu-
facturers Association (SGMA), a United States trade association,
threatened to file a formal complaint against Japan under Section
301 of the Trade Act of 1974.78 Cognizant of the possible investiga-
tion 79 and the threatened SGMA complaint,80 the Japanese Govern-
73. Id. The United States claimed that MITI's actions, see supra notes 64-70 and
accompanying text, nullified or impaired a benefit accruing to the United States "in that U.S.
producers [were] accorded significantly less favorable treatment than Japanese producers in
at least three areas." Sept. 7 Letter, supra note 72, at end. 1. The three areas involved the
arbitrary and time consuming nature of the lot inspection system, the additional costs to
foreign producers of unboxing, attaching the "S" marks, and reboxing bats under the lot
inspection system, and the fact that Japanese importing companies would be reluctant to deal
with a foreign producer because, under the lot inspection system, the importing company is
liable for misuse of the "S" mark (under the factory inspection system, the importer is not
liable for misuse of the "S" mark). Id. at 2.
74. Standards Code, supra note 1, art. 14.2. Under the provisions of article 14.2,
[l]f any Party considers that any benefit accruing to it, directly or Indirectly, under
this Agreement is being nullified or impaired, or that the attainment of any objec-
tive of this Agreement is being impeded, by another Party or Parties, and that its
trade interests are significantly affected, the Party may make written representa-
tions or proposals to the other Party or Parties which it considers to be concerned.
Id. See Sept. 7 Letter, supra note 72, at 1; supra note 22 and accompanying text.
75. Standards Code, supra note 1, art. 14.4. The article states:
If no solution has been reached after consultations under Article 14, paragraphs 1
and 2, the Committee shall meet at the request of any Party to the dispute within
thirty days of receipt of such a request, to investigate the matter with a view to
facilitating a mutually satisfactory solution.
Id. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
76. Standards Code, supra note 1, art. 13; see supra notes 23-31 and accompanying text.
77. Dep't of State Telegram No. 275,923 from the United States Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C., to the United States Embassy, Tokyo I (Sept. 30, 1982) [hereinafter cited
as Telegram No. 275,923]. Since article 14.4 requires the Committee to meet within 30 days
of such request for an investigation, Standards Code, supra note 1, art. 14.4, the United
States expected that the metal bat dispute would be considered at the Committee's October,
1982 meeting. Telegram No. 275,923, supra at 1.
78. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 2041 (1975) (codified as amended at
19 U.S.C. § 2411 (Supp. V 1981)). See J. Com., Nov. 8, 1982, at 23B, col. 5. Under Section
301 of the Trade Act of 1974, the President is authorized to retaliate against unfair trade
practices. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1981).
79. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
80. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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ment offered a new solution. 81 This proposal essentially changed the
lot inspection system, which requires individual inspection of prod-
ucts, 82 to a factory certification system, which allows a manufac-
turer to self-certify its compliance with standards .83
At the December Trade Subcommittee meeting,8 4 the United
States was prepared to exchange letters with Japan to signify ac-
ceptance of the Japanese proposal. 85 Japan, however, offered a
different proposal.88 Although this proposal offered United States
manufacturers treatment similar to that provided to Japanese man-
ufacturers, the United States deemed the proposal inadequate be-
cause it did not help realize the larger objective of opening all
Japanese certification systems to foreign suppliers87 through factory
certification.88 Nevertheless, to expedite the sale of metal bats in
Japan, United States trade officials recommended acceptance of the
new proposal.89
81. See Dep't of State Telegram No. 21,603 from the United States Embassy, Tokyo, to
the United States Secretary of State, Washington, D.C. 1 (Dec. 10, 1982) [hereinafter cited as
Telegram No. 21,603]. The United States revised the proposal and submitted the changes to
Japan. See Memorandum from Don Abelson, Office of the United States Trade Representa-
tive to Jim Murphy, Office of the United States Trade Representative 1 (Nov. 12, 1982)
(concerning the Japanese response to United States revisions of the metal bat proposal)
(available at the Office of the United States Trade Representative, Washington, D.C.).
82. Under the lot inspection system, a certain number of bats from each shipment are
inspected as they arrive at the dock in Japan. See Telegram No. 260,133, supra note 45, at 2.
83. Dep't of State Telegram No. 070,122 from the United States Information Service,
Tokyo, to the United States Secretary of State, Washington, D.C. 1 (Dec. 7, 1982). Under a
factory inspection (certification) system, a manufacturer must have its factory inspected
before receiving the "S" mark. See Telegram No. 260,133, supra note 45, at 2. The manufac-
turer must also participate in a model approval test of three bats. Following completion of
these procedures, a manufacturer may self-certify its products for compliance with applicable
standards. Id.
84. United States officials held separate meetings with Japanese officials from Decem-
ber 1 through December 7, 1982, in search of a solution to the bat dispute. Telegram No.
21,603, supra note 81, at 1.
85. See id.
86. Id.
87. See Dep't of State Telegram No. 01506 from the United States Consulate, Osaka-
Kobe, to the United States Secretary of State, Washington, D.C. 1 (Dec. 22, 1982) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Telegram No. 01506].
88. Id.
89. See Telegram No. 01506, supra note 87, at 1 (which lists several problems existing in
the December 6 proposal, including loss of secret production knowledge and excessive pa-
perwork).
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Three weeks later, the Government of Japan abruptly re-
moved metal bats from the list of specified products which must
have "S" marks under the Consumer Product Safety Law.90 This
created problems for United States manufacturers because they
were unaware of the procedures for obtaining the "SG" insurance
mark required for JSBB approval. 9' These problems were solved
when Japan's Product Safety Association gave the United States a
copy of the procedures for obtaining the "SG" insurance mark. 2 In
March, 1983, after Japan announced its intention to revise its stan-
dards and certification systems laws, the United States and Japan
exchanged letters indicating acceptance of the earlier proposal on
"S" and "SG" marks,93 and the United States withdrew its request
for a Committee investigation under the Standards Code.9 4
90. Dep't of State Telegram No. 01541 from the United States Consulate, Osaka-Kobe,
to the United States Secretary of State, Washington, D.C. 1 (Dec. 29, 1982). As a result,
metal bats produced in the United States could be sold in Japan without the "S" certification
mark. Id. at 2. Japan pledged to continue working toward a solution to the problem of access
to the "S" certification mark encountered by manufacturers of metal bats and the other eight
products designated under the Consumer Product Safety Law, Law No. 31 of 1973 (Japan)
(pressure cookers, motorcycle helmets, baseball batting helmets, infant beds, roller skates,
mountainclimbing ropes, bottled carbonated beverages, and glass bottles). See Mainichi
Daily News, Dec. 28, 1982, at 5, col. 2; Telegram No. 00615, supra note 44, at 9.
91. See Dep't of State Telegram No. 00850 from the United States Embassy, Tokyo, to
the United States Secretary of State, Washington, D.C. 1 (Jan. 14, 1983). The JSBB now
required the "SG" mark instead of the "S" mark. Id. However, the Product Safety Association
had not yet developed procedures for allowing foreign manufacturers to obtain the "SG"
mark. Id.
92. Dep't of State Telegram No. 00186 from the United States Consulate, Osaka-Kobe,
to the United States Secretary of State, Washington, D.C. 1 (Feb. 10, 1983) [hereinafter cited
as Telegram No. 00186]. To receive the "SG" marks, United States manufacturers must
obtain factory inspections, model approvals, and a standard insurance contract with the
Product Safety Association (PSA). Dep't of State Telegram No. 00035 from the United States
Consulate, Osaka-Kobe, to the United States Secretary of State, Washington, D.C. 1 (Jan.
23, 1983). PSA officials agreed to a timetable which allowed for factory registration in May,
1983, PSA model approval by July 1, 1983, application for JSBB authorization by August 1,
1983 and negotiations for the sale of United States bats in Japan during the fall, 1983.
Telegram No. 00186, supra, at 2.
93. Letter from Shinji Fukukawa, Director-General, International Trade Administra-
tion Bureau, MITI, to David R. Macdonald, Deputy United States Trade Representative
(Mar. 9, 1983). On March 14, 1983, the United States presented a letter to Japan which
recognized Japan's December 6 proposal and pledged the United States' cooperation in
implementing the proposal. Dep't of State Telegram No. 072,755 from the United States
Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., to the United States Mission, Geneva 1 (Mar. 17,
1983) [hereinafter cited as Telegram No. 072,7551.
94. Telegram No. 072,755, supra note 93, at 1.
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B. The Importance of the Metal Bat Case
The metal bat case demonstrated to Japanese officials the
problems foreigners have with access to Japan's markets.9 5 As a
result, Japan addressed the underlying problem of access to its
certification systems.98 The revision of the certification systems be-
gan with the formation of a committee to review Japan's standards
and certification laws . 7 After a two-month review, the Committee
issued a report" which announced the formulation of measures99
95. See Telegram No. 00615, supra note 44, at 1. Under the Consumer Product Safety
Law, No. 31 of 1973 (Japan), and 30 other laws establishing certification systems, Telegram
No. 00615, supra note 44, at 3-5, domestic suppliers may receive certification through the
factory registration method, but foreign suppliers are forced to use the lot inspection method.
Id. at 4, 5. Japan recognized the United States' claim that the lot inspection system, which is
time consuming and costly, acts as an "impenetrable non-tariff barrier" that denies foreign
producers equal access to Japan's certification systems. Id. at 5.
96. Id. at 9.
97. Letter from David Macdonald, Deputy United States Trade Representative to
Howard Bruns, President, SGMA (Feb. 9, 1983). United States officials claimed that a major
reason for the establishment of the Japanese review committee was the United States' request
for the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade to investigate Japan's certification proce-
dures for United States-produced metal bats. N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1983, at D5, col. 5. Other
factors leading to the formation of the Japanese review committee included political pressure
on the Nakasone Government caused by increasing economic tensions between the United
States and Japan. Wash. Post, Mar. 26, 1983, at D10, col. 1. This pressure was evident at the
December 3-4, 1982 Trade Subcommittee Meeting where the United States requested that
Japan "implement a national certification policy that provides foreign suppliers treatment
equal to that provided Japanese suppliers under government and non-government certifica-
tion systems." Dep't of State Telegram No. 03014 from the United States Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C., to the United States Embassy, Tokyo 1 (Jan. 6, 1983).
98. Letter from Donald S. Abelson, Director, Technical Trade Barriers, to Sherwin
Gardner, Vice President, Science and Technology, Grocery Manufacturers of America (Mar.
28, 1983) (report entitled "Improvement of Japan's Standards and Certification Systems")
(available at the Office of the United States Trade Representative, Washington, D.C.).
99. The measures were published in a report entitled Review of Standards and Certifi-
cation Systems. See Embassy of Japan, Press Release (Mar. 25, 1983) [hereinafter cited as
Tokyo Press Release]; Dep't of State Telegram No. 114,009 from the United States Secretary
of State, Washington, D.C., to the United States Embassy, Tokyo (Apr. 26, 1983) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Telegram No. 114,009]. The United States claimed that the review addressed all
of the standards-related issues raised In consultations with Japan, including direct access to
Japan's certification systems for foreign suppliers, Increased transparency during the develop-
ment of standards, greater use of international standards, increased acceptance of foreign test
data and continued simplification of import procedures. Office of the United States Trade
Representative, Press Release No. 83/11 (Mar. 25, 1983) (entitled "USTR Brock Hopeful
Following Japanese Standards Review") (hereinafter cited as Washington Press Release]
(available at the Office of the United States Trade Representative, Washington, D.C.). For a
discussion of the issues considered at previous United States-Japan consultations, see supra
notes 34, 37-41 and accompanying text.
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intended to open Japan's markets. 0 0 These measures included pro-
posed amendments to seventeen Japanese laws dealing with stan-
dards and certification systems.' 0 Sixteen of these amendments 0 2
were contained in omnibus legislation 0 3 passed by Japan's Diet.10 4
The changes in Japanese law are "the most significant develop-
ment in the [United States-Japan] bilateral relationship since the
conclusion of the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotia-
tions." 05 The majority of United States exports to Japan, possibly
100. See Tokyo Press Release, supra note 99, at 1. The Japanese Government stated that
its most important goal was to eliminate discrimination between foreign and Japanese
producers in Japan's certification procedures. Id. This objective would be achieved by
amending nearly 20 laws (including the Pharmaceuticals Affairs Law, No. 145 of 1960
(Japan) and the Consumer Product Safety Law, No. 31 of 1973 (Japan)) to allow foreign
suppliers to obtain certification directly from the Japanese government on the same basis as
Japanese producers. Id.; see Telegram No. 114,009, supra note 99, at 1.
101. See Washington Press Release, supra note 99, at 1.
102. One of the proposed 17 law changes was approved by the Japanese Diet in a special
bill on May 13, 1983. See Wall St. J., May 19, 1983, at 38, col. 3.
103. Dep't of Com. Telegram No. 07313 from the United States Embassy, Tokyo, to the
Secretary of State, Washington, D.C. 1 (Apr. 19, 1983).
104. The lower half of Japan's Diet approved the legislation on May 10, 1983. Dep't of
State Telegram No. 00640 from United States Consulate, Osaka-Kobe, to the United States
Secretary of State, Washington, D.C. 1 (May 13, 1983). The upper house of Japan's Diet
approved the bill on May 18, 1983. Dep't of State Telegram No. 00681 from the United States
Consulate, Osaka-Kobe to the United States Secretary of State, Washington, D.C. I (May 19,
1983). The 16 laws amended are: the Consumer Product Safety Law, No. 31 of 1973 (Japan);
the High Pressure Gas Control Law, No. 204 of 1951 (Japan); the Law Concerning the
Securing of Safety and the Optimization of Transaction of Liquified Petroleum Gas, No. 149
of 1967 (Japan); the Law Concerning the Examination and Regulation of Manufacture, etc.
of Chemical Substances, No. 117 of 1973 (Japan); the Measurement Law, No. 207 of 1951
(Japan); the Electrical Appliances and Materials Control Law, No. 234 of 1961 (Japan); the
Gas Utility Law, No. 51 of 1954 (Japan); the Fertilizer Control Law, No. 127 of 1950
(Japan); the Agricultural Mechanization Promotion Law, No. 252 of 1953 (Japan); the
Agricultural Chemical Regulation Law; No. 82 of 1948 (Japan); the Law Concerning Safety
Assurance and Quality Improvement of Feed, No. 35 of 1953 (Japan); the Law Concerning
Standardization and Proper Labeling of Agricultural and Forestry Products (JAS Law), No.
175 of 1950 (Japan); the Nutrition Improvement Law, No. 248 of 1952 (Japan); the Pharma-
ceutical Affairs Law, No. 145 of 1960 (Japan); the Road Vehicles Act, No. 105 of 1960
(Japan); and the Industrial Safety and Health Law, No. 57 of 1972 (Japan). Comm. on
Technical Barriers to Trade, Information on Implementation and Administration of the
Agreement, GATT Doc. No. TBT/I/Add.32 (1983) (communication from Japan to the
Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade) [hereinafter cited as GATT Notification].
105. Office of the United States Trade Representative, Press Release No. 83/16, at I
(May 18, 1983) (entitled "Major Japanese Shift") [hereinafter cited as May 18 Press Release]
(available at the Office of the United States Trade Representative, Washington, D.C.).
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up to five billion dollars worth of trade, could be affected by the
changes to seventeen Japanese standard and certification laws. 106
Nevertheless, the extent to which the changes will improve United
States manufacturers' access to Japan's markets depends on the
regulations drafted to implement these revisions, including the pro-
cedures which must be formulated to provide United States pro-
ducers with direct access to Japan's certification systems. 10 7
III. CRITIQUE OF THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
PROVISIONS
The objectives of the Tokyo Round negotiations were to im-
prove the effectiveness of the dispute settlement provisions of
GATT and the Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN) Codes'0 8
and reduce technical barriers to trade. 0 9 To determine the effec-
tiveness of the Standards Code's dispute settlement provisions, the
dispute settlement proceedings held between the United States and
Japan may be analyzed in light of the Tokyo Round objectives.
106. Id. at 2. Approximately 60% of United States-manufactured exports to Japan will
be affected. 129 CONG. REc. S7038 (daily ed. May 18, 1983) (statement of Sen. Chafee
discussing the May 18, 1983 amendments to Japan's standards and certification laws) [herein-
after cited as Statement of Sen. Chafee]. See May 18 Press Release, supra note 105, at 2. See
also Japanese Diet Passes Legislation Easing Standards Laws For Manufactured Imports, 19
U.S. Exp. WEEKLY (BNA) 281, 281 (May 24, 1983). The changes are intended to allow
manufacturers to self-certify imports through factory registration instead of costly lot inspec-
tion. See Statement of Sen. Chafee, supra, at S7038. Products which manufacturers may self-
certify through factory registation include: (1) products covered by the Consumer Product
Safety Law, No. 31 of 1973 (Japan), including pressure cookers, infant beds, and glass bottles
containing carbonated beverages, see Telegram No. 00615, supra note 44, at 3; (2) liquified
petroleum gas equipment; (3) electrical appliances; (4) gas appliances; (5) fertilizers; and (6)
agricultural chemicals. See GATT Notification, supra note 104, at 2-7.
107. May 18 Press Release, supra note 105, at 3. Bilateral discussions of the May 18,
1983 changes in Japanese standards and certification laws were held in Tokyo on July 27 and
28, 1983. Dep't of State Telegram No. 14,664 from the United States Embassy, Tokyo, to the
United States Secretary of State, Washington, D.C. 1, 2 (Aug. 1, 1983). However, just five
months after Japan amended these laws, a group of United States testing experts claimed that
the Japanese government was not enforcing these revisions. See Wall St. J., Oct. 20, 1983, at
34, col. 2.
108. See infra note 111 and accompanying text.
109. See infra note 156 and accompanying text.
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A. Effectiveness of the Standards Code's Dispute Settlement
Provisions
At the Tokyo Round, an important goal of the participants
was legal reform" of the dispute settlement provisions of GATT."'
110. The Tokyo Declaration required the negotiators to consider "improvements in the
international framework for the conduct of world trade." Graham, Results of the Tokyo
Round, supra note 2, at 169; see also GATT, GATT ACTIVITIES IN 1979 AND CONCLUSION OF
THE TOKYO ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 15 (1980). This led to the forma-
tion of a negotiating group on "framework" reform. Id. One agreement produced by the
Framework Group, the Draft Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute
Settlement and Surveillance, Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Group "Framework," GATT
Doc. No. MTN/FR/W/20/Rev.2 (1979), reprinted in STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND
MEANS, SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 96TH CONG., IST SESS., MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIA-
TIONS 375 (Joint Comm. Print 1979), clarified the dispute settlement procedures under
GATT. Graham, Results of the Tokyo Round, supra note 2, at 171.
111. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 94TH CONG., 1ST SESs., BACK-
GROUND AND STATUS OF THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 73 (Comm. Print 1975)
[hereinafter cited as BACKGROUND AND STATUS OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS]. See R.
HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY 267 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as R. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM]; Hudec, GATT Dispute Settlement After the
Tokyo Round: An Unfinished Business, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 145, 148, 156-57 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Hudec, GATT Dispute Settlement].
During the 1950's, GATT's dispute settlement procedures were actively utilized. Id. at
151. However, in the 1960's, the number of cases invoking these disputes settlement proce-
dures decreased sharply. R. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM, supra, at 228. The proce-
dures had become ineffective. Hudec, GATT Dispute Settlement, supra, at 147; Graham,
Reforming the International Trading System, supra note 8, at 29; Graham, Results of the
Tokyo Round, supra note 2, at 171.
One reason for this ineffectiveness was the growing practice of signatories to avoid
enforcing their rights under GATT. During the 1950's, GATT's regulatory policy involved
strict enforcement of GATT obligations. See Hudec, GATT Dispute Settlement, supra, at
151. When violations of GATT rules occurred, the signatories were quick to adjudicate their
legal complaints through GATT's dispute settlement provisions. Id. In the 1960's, the signato-
ries became reluctant to use GATT's enforcement procedures. Id. This reluctance was due to
two developments. First, several of the original GATT rules became obsolete. R. HUDEC, THE
GATT LEGAL SYSTEM, supra, at 193-94; see Jackson, The Jurisprudence of International
Trade: The DISC Case in GATT, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 747, 748 (1978). The signatories began
to ignore these rules and concentrated on reaching practical solutions. Hudec, GATT Dispute
Settlement, supra, at 151. This breakdown of the original GATT rules led signatory govern-
ments to question the utility of a rule-oriented approach in general. Id. The second develop-
ment causing this reluctance to use GATT's enforcement procedures was the change in
political power within GATT. Id. The growth of a strong block of developing countries
increased the superpowers preference for a less rule-oriented approach. Id. The developing
countries pressed for strict compliance with GATT rules by the developed countries. Id.
Finding these demands excessive, the developed countries' antilegalistic attitude grew as their
compliance with the GATT rules decreased. Id.
Another reason for the ineffectiveness of GATT's dispute settlement provisions was the
lack of detailed procedures and time limits in these provisions. R. HUDEc, THE GATT LEGAL
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Under GATT, defendant countries could delay and obstruct com-
mittee consideration of a dispute. 112 In response to this problem, the
signatories revised GATT's dispute settlement provisions. 1 3 The
Tokyo Round negotiators formulated specific procedures "for the
establishment of panels of experts to hear complaints and for the
ultimate disposal of cases,"'"1 4 and suggested time limits for the
different phases of dispute settlement under GATT."5 The negotia-
tors formulated the Tokyo Round nontariff barriers (NTB) codes'
dispute settlement provisions based on the revised GATT provi-
sions. "6 Thus, dispute settlement under the Standards Code should
be more effective than dispute settlement under GATT as imple-
mented before the Tokyo Round.
Some commentators have found improvement in the dispute
settlement provisions of the NTB Codes," 7 including the new time
limits for the different phases of the dispute settlement process.""
However, several writers have criticized the dispute settlement pro-
visions of the new Codes. Two of these criticisms are that the Codes
SYSTEM, supra, at 269; Graham, Results of the Tokyo Round, supra note 2, at 171; see
Hudec, GATT Dispute Settlement, supra, at 171.
112. Hudec, GATT Dispute Settlement, supra note 111, at 171-72. According to one
commentator, "[tihe most frequent complaint about the panel procedure in the 1970's was
that the defendant governments were able to obstruct or delay the panel procedure ...
thereby increasing the time, effort and unpleasantness involved in the adjudication of a legal
complaint." Id. at 171.
113. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 2, arts. XXII, XXIII. See also
Hudec, GATT Dispute Settlement, supra, note 111, at 170-72; Graham, Results of the Tokyo
Round, supra note 2, at 129. For a description of GATT's dispute settlement provisions
contained in articles XXII and XXIII, see Jackson, GATT as an Instrument for the Settlement
of Trade Disputes, AM. Soc. INT'L L.: PROCEINcS 144 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Jackson,
Settlement of Trade Dispute].
114. Graham, Results of the Tokyo Round, supra note 2, at 171. These improved
procedures included a standing list of potential GATT panelists. Id. For a description of the
revised panel procedures contained in article XXIII of GATT, see Hudec, GATT Dispute
Settlement, supra note 111, at 174-77.
115. Hudec, GATT Dispute Settlement, supra note 111, at 174-77.
116. See Judicial Conference of Customs and Patent Appeals, supra note 22, a 2-93;
Graham, Results of the Tokyo Round, supra note 2, at 171.
117. See Judicial Conference of Customs and Patent Appeals, supra note 22, aL 595;
Hudec, GA TT Dispute Settlement, supra note 111, at 187; Jackson, The Birth of the GA TT-
MTN System: A Constitutional Appraisal, 12 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 21, 46 (1980);
Comment, GATT and the Tokyo Round; Legal Implications of the New Trade Agreement,
11 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 302, 310 (1981).
118. Judicial Conference of Customs and Patent Appeals, supra note 22, at 595.
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should require even more stringent time limits for the different
dispute settlement phases"1 9 and that the Codes overly emphasize
consultations rather than third party adjudication (i.e. committee
or panel proceedings), thereby undermining the dispute settlement
process. 120
1. Result-Oriented Criteria
The slow progress of the United States-Japan metal bat dispute
seemingly supports the recommendation for more detailed dispute
settlement procedures involving third party adjudication and less
emphasis on consultations.1 21 However, the criteria for determining
the effectiveness of the Standards Code's dispute settlement provi-
sions should not be the number of disputes settled or the speed of
the settlement process. 1 22 The effectiveness of the dispute settlement
procedures is more accurately determined by criteria which mea-
sure results.' 23
Five such result-oriented criteria were utilized to determine
the effectiveness of GATT's dispute settlement provisions.'2 4 These
criteria may be applied to the Standards Code's dispute settlement
119. See id.
120. See id. at 598. The commentator argues that this stress on consultations as a means
of settling disputes under the MTN Codes will result in cases being bargained out based on
political factors, not rules of law, and this will prevent a body of precedent committee rulings
from developing under the Codes. Id. This indicates that dispute settlement will remain a
political and time consuming process. Id. at 596-97.
121. The fact that the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade did not act within 30
days on the United States' request for an investigation of the bat case, see supra note 77 and
accompanying text, thus violating article 14.4 of the Standards Code, supports the claim that
more formal procedures are necessary to implement the Standards Code's dispute settlement
provisions. Standards Code, supra note 1, art. 14.4; see supra note 119 and accompanying
text. In addition, metal bats will not be sold in Japan until three years after the United States
first raised the bat issue with Japan. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. This confirms
the view that the emphasis on consultations allowed Japan to delay the metal bat dispute
settlement procedures.
122. Jackson, Settlement of Trade Dispute, supra note 113, at 152-53.
123. See id.
124. Id. at 153. These criteria were proposed by Professor John H. Jackson, an authority
on the dispute resolution procedures of GATT, at the 61st annual meeting of the American
Society of International Law, held on April 27, 1967. Id. For other articles by Jackson
discussing GATT and its dispute settlement provisions, see Jackson, The Jurisprudence of
International Trade: The DISC Case in GATT, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 747 (1978); Jackson, The
Crumbling Institutions of the Liberal Trade System, 12 J. WoRLn TRADE L. 93 (1978).
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provisions because of the similar objectives and content of such
provisions in GATT and the Standards Code. 2 5
The first criterion is that "the procedure helps effectuate other
goals of the particular institution. 1' 26 This criterion, as applied to
GATT, means that the dispute settlement procedures should help
enforce the particular obligations of GATT.12 7 Under the Standards
Code, the settlement of the metal bat dispute prompted changes in
Japanese standards and certification laws. 28 The effect of these
changes is to reduce nontariff barriers to trade. 2 9 Thus, the United
States' implementation of the Code's dispute settlement provisions
fulfilled this criterion by enforcing Japan's obligations under the
Standards Code. 30
The second criterion is that the procedures "[tend] to assist
friendly relations between parties, and not exacerbate them.' 3'
Under GATT, the parties are encouraged to achieve a mutually
satisfactory solution through consultation and conciliation. 32 This
is important because parties to GATT will continue to have com-
125. Article XXII of GATT states: "Each contracting party shall accord sympathetic
consideration to, and shall afford adequate opportunity for consultation regarding, such
representations as may be made by another contracting party with respect to any matter
affecting the operation of this Agreement." General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra
note 2, art. XXII. This is nearly the same language as is contained in article 14.1 of the
Standards Code. See Standards Code, supra note 1, art. 14.1. In addition, article XXIII of
GATT, concerning nullification or impairment of GATT objectives, provides for written
representation to the offending party in the same manner as provided under article 14.2 of
the Standards Code. See Standards Code, supra note 1, art. 14.2; General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, supra note 2, art. XXIII.
126. Jackson, Settlement of Trade Dispute, supra note 113, at 153. The other goals of
the Standards Code signatories are the major principles of the Code. See supra notes 9-20 and
accompanying text; infra notes 158-79 and accompanying text.
127. Jackson, Settlement of Trade Dispute, supra note 113, at 153. Jackson concludes
that GATT, before the Tokyo Round reforms, least fulfilled this first criterion because of the
weaknesses and self-defeating effects of GATT sanction. Id. These weaknesses include
GATT's stress on informality and conciliation (i.e. consultations) throughout the dispute
settlement procedures and its lack of effective sanctions for GATT violations. Id. at 151-52.
128. See supra notes 95-107 and accompanying text,
129. See infra notes 159-79 and accompanying text.
130. Id. As previously discussed, the metal bat case was not the only factor leading to
Japan's revision of its standards and certification systems laws. Nevertheless, the bat case
must be considered one of the most important factors. See supra note 97 and accompanying
text.
131. Jackson, Settlement of Trade Dispute, supra note 113, at 153.
132. Id. at 154.
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mercial relationships after a dispute has been settled.' 33 The parties
to the metal bat dispute used the Standards Code to reach an
acceptable solution through bilateral consultations without a Com-
mittee investigation.' 34 Instead of aggravating relations between
the United States and Japan, the consultations led to improved
access' 35 to Japan's markets for a variety of products.' 36
The third objective of effective dispute settlement is that the
procedures "reasonably [protect] the interests of nonparties and
parties to the immediate controversy."'' 37 GATT provides for notifi-
cation to all signatories of any formal proceedings138 so that all
interested parties may participate in the dispute resolution proceed-
ings.' 39 In the metal bat controversy, all signatories to the Standards
Code were notified of the dispute concerning access to Japan's
certification systems after the United States requested a Committee
investigation. 40 Each signatory would have been represented if the
Committee had investigated the bat dispute.' 41 In addition, the
interests of all the signatories were promoted by the changes in
Japanese law because access to Japan's certification systems will be
improved for all foreign manufacturers.' 42
The fourth goal of dispute settlement procedures is to promote
"justice. "''43 Justice for GATT purposes has been defined as reasona-
bly accurate fact-finding and "a reference to higher and relatively
objective standards, such as a collective international morality,
which does not depend solely upon power or might. '144
Since there was no investigation in the metal bat dispute, the
accuracy of the fact-finding was not in issue. "45 However, because
133. Id.
134. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 101-04.
136. See supra notes 95-107.
137. Jackson, Settlement of Trade Dispute, supra note 113, at 153.
138. Id. at 154.
139. Id.
140. All signatories are notified of matters brought before the Committee on Technical
Barriers to Trade because every signatory is a participating member of the Committee. See
Standards Code, supra note 1, art. 13.1.
141. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
143. Jackson, Settlement of Trade Dispute, supra note 113, at 153.
144. Id.
145. Fact-finding by the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade did not occur
because the dispute settlement process did not proceed beyond the consultations phase..See
supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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the Standards Code provides for distribution of an investigative
report to all contracting parties, 46 international moral pressure is
likely to promote voluntary settlement. Thus, the threat of interna-
tional attention can be focused on the 'wrongdoer' and the fact of
its wrongdoing can enter into all other relations and negotiations of
the party.147 In the metal bat controversy, Japan desired to avoid
the publicity associated with third party adjudication of interna-
tional disputes. 48 When the United States requested a Committee
investigation, Japan sought a rapid solution to the dispute. 149
The final criterion is that the costs of dispute settlement do not
unduly exceed the benefits. 50 The costs of panel operations and
Contracting Parties' debates' 5 ' under GATT are believed to be as
low as that of other international dispute settlement processes. 52
The benefits of these procedures are considered to be higher than
most. 53 While precise statistics concerning the costs of the Stan-
dards Code's dispute settlement procedures are not available, these
costs are comparable to those under GATT. 1 4 This criterion is
satisfied because as a result of the changes in Japanese standards
and certification laws, "as much as five billion dollars worth of
trade may be affected." 155
146. Jackson, Settlement of Trade Dispute, supra note 113, at 154. See Standards Code,
supra note 1, at annex 3.
147. Jackson, Settlement of Trade Dispute, supra note 113, at 154.
148. See generally Telegram No. 00615, supra note 44, at 8.
149. See id. at 7-8. The threat of third party adjudication (i.e. committee or panel
proceedings) influences the parties toward more moderate behavior, thus creating a higher
probability of settling a dispute through negotiations. R. BILDER, MANAGING THE RISKS OF
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 58 (1981). This is especially true for Japan, in that the Japanese
did not want to consider improved dispute settlement provisions during the Tokyo Round
because Japan would prefer to settle disputes without publicizing them. See Judicial Confer-
ence on Customs and Patent Appeals, supra note 22, at 592.
150. Jackson, Settlement of Trade Dispute, supra note 113, at 153.
151. Id. at 155.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. The costs of dispute settlement under the Standards Code are probably similar to
those costs under GATT because of the parrallel construction of the dispute settlement
provisions of the Standards Code and GATT. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
Based on these similarities, the costs of dispute settlement under the Standards Code should
be as low as the costs under GATT. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
155. May 18 Press Release, supra note 105, at 2. See supra note 106 and accompanying
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2. Reducing Nontariff Barriers to Trade
A major objective of the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations was the reduction of nontariff barriers to trade.' 56
Therefore, another approach to analyzing the effectiveness of the
Code's dispute settlement provisions as applied in the metal bat case
is to assess the reduction of nontariff barriers to trade.'57 To deter-
mine whether the dispute settlement process reduced technical bar-
riers, the effect of the metal bat case on Japan's compliance with
the five basic obligations of the Standards Code must be evalu-
ated.158
The first of these obligations, and the most important,159 is
that standards, technical regulations, and rules of certification sys-
tems should not create unnecessary obstacles to trade. 160 As previ-
ously noted, the United States contended that Japan prevented
access to certification systems, limited foreign input into the devel-
opment of Japanese standards, and refused to accept United States-
produced test data in Japan.'"' The Japanese standards and cer Fi-
cation laws'12 were reviewed in order to provide direct access -
certification systems, to increase the use of open procedures during
the development of standards, and to facilitate acceptance of for-
eign test data.'6 3 The resulting changes in Japanese law should
remove unnecessary barriers to trade.16 4
Signatories must also establish the same standards, technical
regulations, certification and testing treatment for imported as well
as for domestic products. 65 The metal bat case forced Japan to
acknowledge that numerous Japanese laws discriminated between
imported products and Japanese products.166 Revision of Japanese
156. BACKGROUND AND STATUS OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 111,
at 3.
157. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
158. See generally GREEN REPORT, supra note 6, at 5-6.
159. Id. at 5.
160. Standards Code, supra note 1, arts. 2.1, 7.1. The Code prohibits both intentional
and unintentional actions which violate the above provisions. GREEN REPORT, supra note 6, at
5; U.S. DE 'T OF COM., supra note 1, at 4.
161. See supra notes 37, 39, 40 and accompanying text.
162. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 99, 100 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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law 16 7 provided equal access to certification systems and equal ac-
ceptance of test data.68
The Code further obligates signatories to ensure that access to
regional certification systems is granted without discrimination. 169
The metal bat controversy arose from a violation of this obligation
by the Government of Japan and the JSBB.170 The settlement of the
metal bat dispute not only provided for equal access to Japan's
certification systems for foreign metal bat manufacturers,' but
also led to equal access for suppliers of other products, including
electrical appliances, agricultural chemicals, and petroleum gas
equipment. 172
Signatories, when developing new standards, must use re-
quirements173 promulgated by an international standards organiza-
tion. 174 After a review of its standards and certification systems,
Japan announced that it would make greater use of international
guidelines when developing new standards.17 5
Finally, the Code obligates signatories to specify technical
regulations and standards in terms of performance rather than
design or descriptive characteristics. 76 Japan violated this obliga-
tion by imposing technical regulations which required the use of an
167. See supra notes 97-104 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 51-65 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
172. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
173. Standards Code, supra note 1, art. 2.2. Article 2.2 states: "Where technical
regulations or standards are required and relevant international standards exist . . . , Parties
shall use [the international standards] . . . as a basis for the technical regulations or stan-
dards." Id. However, if national security requirements, the prevention of deceptive practices,
health or safety factors, fundamental climate or other geographical factors, and fundamental
technological problems, make the use of international standards inappropriate, the obligation
to use the standards will be suspended. See id.
174. 19 U.S.C. § 2571(5) (Supp. V 1981).
175. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
176. Standards Code, supra note 1, art. 2.4. "Wherever appropriate, Parties shall
specify technical regulations and standards in terms of performance rather than design or
descriptive characteristics." Id. "For example, instead of specifying the dimensions of the
parts of a motor in centimeters or inches, signatories should use minimum or maximum
power performance levels." GREEN REPORT, supra note 6, at 6; U.S. DE'T OF COM., supra
note 1, at 5. This provision "is intended to ensure that standards and regulations are defined
only in terms of those product characteristics that are essential to the objective of the
standard." Note, Technical Analysis, supra note 1, at 195.
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inferior metal alloy and a rubber plug in the production of metal
bats.177 Following bilateral consultations, Japan revoked the design
criteria, 178 thereby bringing their technical regulations into compli-
ance with the Code.179
CONCLUSION
During the three years that the Standards Code has been in
effect, the dispute settlement provisions have not been invoked in a
consistent pattern. In the only case that has been resolved, these
procedures have helped to achieve two objectives of the Tokyo
Round. The metal bat case demonstrated the improved effective-
ness of the dispute settlement provisions and led to the reduction of
nontariff barriers to trade. While three years of operation and one
dispute settlement under these procedures do not warrant a conclu-
sive determination, effective application of the Standards Code's
dispute settlement provisions in the metal bat dispute indicates that
there is presently no justification for new procedures that would
reduce emphasis on consultations and provide more specific time
limits for each phase of the dispute settlement process.
Fred J. Coccodrilli
177. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
178. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
179. Standards Code, supra note 1, art. 2.4.
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